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Abstract 
We examine the role of organized labor in the restructuring experience of two coal-mining 
regions in the Czech Republic and Romania in the 1990s. Under similar external circum-
stances, the Ostrava region of the Czech Republic undertook early gradual restructuring, 
whereas the Jiu Valley region in Romania did not undertake restructuring until 1997, which 
was followed by massive layoffs in the sector. We conduct a quantitative exercise that ac-
counts for mine productivity, labor-market conditions, and constraints in compensating laid- 
-off miners. We show that the belated restructuring in the Jiu Valley was inefficient: gra-
dual restructuring with reasoned compensation would have benefited both the miners and 
the state. An important factor in the delayed restructuring was the miners’ resistance to it. 
We discuss what motivated their opposition and the consequences. 
1. Introduction 
Organized labor is often characterized as an obstacle to economic progress. 
General versions of this view can be found in (Olson, 1982) and (Parente, Prescott, 
2000), who designate the rent-seeking and rent-preserving activities of interest groups 
such as labor unions and professional associations the key factor in stagnating eco-
nomies.
1 This aspect of organized labor is likely to be most visible when the status 
quo is challenged. In this paper we conduct a case study of such an episode in the re-
structuring of coal mining in the Ostrava region in the Czech Republic and the Jiu 
Valley region in Romania. The initial motivation for this research came from reading 
about a violent protest by the Jiu Valley coal miners,
2 which turned out to be a pat-
tern in the restructuring experience of the region. Our objective is to clarify the natu-
re of such an action with a view toward evaluating the connection between organized 
labor and economic progress.
3 Did the miners’ action indeed hinder the path of effi-
cient restructuring? If so, what are the underlying reasons for, and the corroborating 
* We, the authors are grateful for funding from the Global Development Network. We thank, without impli-
cating them, Ayse Imrohoroglu, Edward C. Prescott, James Schmitz, and seminar participants at CERGE-EI, 
the Global Development Network Workshop in Prague, the International Society for New Institutional
Economics Conference in Boston, the European Association of Labor Economists Conference in Seville,
the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, and Copenhagen Business School for helpful comments. 
** CERGE-EI is a joint workplace of the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles
University, Prague, and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. 
1 For the opposite view that various associations can facilitate politico-economic modernization, see
(Putnam, 1992). 
2 See (The Economist, 1999). 
3 The spirit of this research is shared by Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002), who study the change in 
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factors of, such an action? Along the way, we make useful comparisons with Ostra-
va’s restructuring experience, which was markedly peaceful despite similar external 
conditions. 
In Section 2, we describe the restructuring experiences of the two regions, 
Ostrava and Jiu Valley. At the beginning of the 1990s, both regions went through 
a sharp decline in coal production as national industrial drive ceased. Gradual re-
structuring, mostly downsizing of employment, followed in the Ostrava region. In 
the Jiu Valley region, on the other hand, there was no restructuring at all until 1997, 
when the new progressive government managed to carry out massive layoffs over 
two years. The layoffs created a crisis in the regional labor market. As alluded to 
above, there was a sharp contrast in the miners’ behavior toward restructuring be-
tween the regions. The Ostrava miners cooperated with the government throughout, 
whereas the Jiu Valley miners fought not only against restructuring the region’s 
mines  but  against  the reformist  agenda  in  general.  The extreme  swing  in  the Jiu 
Valley  restructuring  path  reflected  the initial  success  and  subsequent  failure  of 
the miners’ action in the context of national politics.  
In Section 3, we conduct a quantitative exercise in order to evaluate how (in)-
efficient the restructuring paths were in the two regions. The presumption would be 
that the extreme swing in the Jiu Valley restructuring was socially inefficient: either 
the early stagnant phase or the later massive-layoff phase would have been ineffi-
cient. In comparison, the steady pace of Ostrava’s restructuring would seem efficient. 
By explicitly modeling the optimal path of restructuring, we obtain a degree of cla-
rity on the aspects of the actual restructuring path that were inefficient, which would 
then need to be explained. Our method is to estimate the value of the (laid-off) mi-
ners’ labor both inside and outside the mines, taking into consideration the expected 
unemployment duration, which depends on the restructuring path.
4 We take the dis-
counted sum of this value to be the measure of efficiency. We show that in both 
regions the most efficient path would have been a large-scale layoff over the first few 
years. The actual restructuring path of Ostrava was not far from the most efficient 
one whereas that of Jiu Valley was far from it: the efficiency loss (i.e., the efficiency 
gap between the most efficient and the actual path) was three times greater in Jiu Val-
ley than in Ostrava. Therefore, our exercise mainly supports the view that the delay in 
restructuring Jiu Valley mines was socially inefficient.  
In Section 4, we address why restructuring was delayed in Jiu Valley. The pro-
ximate reason is the aforementioned miners’ action against restructuring. We extend 
our quantitative exercise and show that gradual restructuring with severance payment 
under a reasonable government budget constraint would have benefited both the mi-
ners and the government. This motivates us to look for additional explanatory factors 
outside our exercise. Notable among these is the militant history of Jiu Valley miners 
in contrast to Ostrava miners. We also discuss the corroborating factors for the mi-
ners’ action, in particular the miners’ alliance with the conservative faction of the go-
vernment. A probable motivation for the conservative faction was the sheer violence 
4 Our model can be viewed as a version of the sectoral reallocation model (e.g., (Aghion, Blanchard,
1994), (Castanheira, Roland, 2000)) that studies the properties of transition paths as resources are re-
allocated from the state to the private sector. In comparison to the others, our model is designed for
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that could be unleashed by the miners toward political opponents. In the end, the suc-
cess and failure of the miners’ actions were determined by the Romanian population. 
When the electorate turned against the alliance, it crumbled and the miners were fi-
nally defeated as a political force.  
In Section 5, we summarize the results and conclude the paper.  
2.  Restructuring Experiences of the Two Regions 
In this section, we describe the restructuring experiences of Ostrava and Jiu 
Valley based on, among other sources, the interviews that we conducted.
5 Each of 
the two regions is a well-defined geographic and economic zone 
6 that produces vir-
tually all deep-mined black coal in the respective country. In the 1980s, coal pro-
duction was highly valued as a source of energy: the national production structure 
was skewed toward energy-intense heavy industries. With the beginning of transition 
came an abrupt decline in industrial production, which led to a sharp reduction in 
coal production. In Ostrava the reduction was on the order of 10 to 25 percent stretch-
ing over a couple of years; in Jiu Valley it was nearly 50 percent, all within the first 
year.
7 Thus a sort of ‘demand’ shock set the stage for restructuring. Gradual restruc-
turing, mostly downsizing of employment, followed in the Ostrava region. In con-
trast, in the Jiu Valley region there was no restructuring at all until 1997, followed by 
massive layoffs over two years. Tables 1 and 2 present the production and employ-
ment figures from 1990 to 2001.
8,9 Figures 1 and 2 visualize the strikingly different 
paths of restructuring between the two regions. The differences in the two regions’ paths 
of restructuring mirrored those of the national economies. The Czech Republic made  
5 We interviewed government officials, mining company managers, union representatives, and researchers.
Five interviews were in Prague and Ostrava in 2002, and fourteen in Bucharest, Jiu Valley, and Cluj in
2002 and 2003. These were complemented by previous studies, mainly sociological studies on the effects 
of restructuring in Jiu Valley, which are referenced throughout. 
6 To be precise, the Ostrava region refers to the districts of Ostrava and Karvina in northern Moravia, and
the Jiu Valley region refers to the townships of Petrosani, Aninosa, Lupeni, Petrila, Uricani, and Vulcan in 
Hunedoara County.  
7 These are rough estimates based on Statistical Yearbooks of the two countries and Tables 1 and 2 (see
Footnote 8). According to the Czech Statistical Yearbooks for 1986–1991, coal production in the Ostrava 
region was between 22 and 23 million tons per year from 1985 to 1989, dropping to about 20 million tons
in 1990 and 1991. According to the Romanian Statistical Yearbook for 1993, hard coal production in Ro-
mania was between 11 and 12 million tons per year from 1986 to 1989, dropping to between 5 and 6 mil-
lion tons from 1990 to 1992. Discrepancies between these Figures 1 and 2 and those in Tables 1 and 2
may be due to different classification of coal, different degrees of processing, inclusion/exclusion of minor
regions, etc. 
8 The data for Ostrava are from the yearbooks published by the Czech Mining Institute; the data for Jiu
Valley were obtained directly from the CNH, the only mining company in the region. We cautiously
present the 1990 data for the Ostrava mines: their only source is the 1993 yearbook and the data from this
yearbook are in general somewhat different from the subsequent yearbooks. For both regions the em-
ployment figures are for the workers in mines, excluding the headquarters and auxiliary units. Much of
the change in the number of these excluded workers represents spin-off units (e.g., social service) that are 
not directly related to mining. We focus on the restructuring of mines proper and abstract from this peri-
pheral issue. 
9 The improvement in labor productivity is largely due to downsizing. In particular, the Jiu Valley mines
had a large slack in labor until 1997, given the large initial decline in output. Further, there was little in-
vestment in new technology in Jiu Valley throughout the period. Some Ostrava mines, however, adopted
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gradual, steady progress toward a market economy. Starting further away from a mar-
ket economy, Romania undertook few reforms until a  new government came to 
power in 1996. As a consequence, the Romanian economy went through sizable swings 
in the aggregate economy in contrast to the milder trajectory of the Czech Republic, 
as can be seen in the aggregate output data presented in Tables 1 and 2.
10  
Between the two regions there was a marked difference in the miners’ beha-
vior toward restructuring. In the Ostrava region, the miners’ union cooperated with 
the  government – and the  government consulted with the  union – which led to 
a peaceful process of restructuring despite the significant decline in employment. In 
the Jiu Valley region, in contrast, the miners’ union was not only against mining re-
structuring but was an active conservative force in national politics. Notably, miners 
made marches to Bucharest, called mineriadas,  on several occasions to violently 
quell the progressive movement. In 1997, however, the new government managed to 
carry out massive layoffs using a carrot and stick approach: it provided severance 
payments of up to 20 months of wages while keeping the charismatic union leader 
FIGURE 1  Restucturing Path in Ostrava 
 
 
FIGURE 2  Restructuring Path in Jiu Valley 
10 The aggregate output and unemployment data are from World Development Indicators 2007, published
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Miran Cozma in jail. When the released Cozma mounted another mineriada in 1999, 
the  government outwitted him and put him back in jail with a  17-year sentence; 
the miners were finally defeated as a political force.  
The gradual and steady pace of the  Ostrava restructuring path resulted in 
a  favorable unemployment experience for the  ex-miners, whereas the  delayed and 
massive layoffs in Jiu Valley created a crisis in the labor market. This can be seen in 
the unemployment rates presented in Tables 1 and 2.
11 The contrasting unemploy-
ment situation stemmed in part from the initial condition. Jiu Valley is an isolated 
mono-industrial region and could offer few opportunities to ex-miners. The Ostrava 
region had a larger and more diversified labor market, and could absorb layoffs with 
relative ease until the late 1990s, when the restructuring of the metallurgical industry 
strained the market.
12 There was also a marked difference in the ex-miners’ behavior 
toward job searches. The Ostrava ex-miners took more initiatives to find work and had 
a reputation for making good workers in new occupations. The Jiu Valley ex-miners, 
on the other hand, were more reluctant to accept low-wage work and had a tendency 
to protest for governmental assistance.
13 Notably, following the massive layoffs some 
ex-miners mounted a hunger strike in order to obtain benefits from the government, 
which became routinized. 
14   
Some of the difference in the miner’s behavior may have been due to the de-
sign of the social programs for ex-miners. As mentioned above, the main form of com-
pensation for ex-miners in Jiu Valley was severance payments ranging from 12 to 
20 months of a miner’s wage. There were other attempts to ease the transition from 
layoffs, such as training programs coordinated by the National Agency for Develop-
11 The labor market data were directly obtained in various bits from the statistics and labor offices at both 
the regional and national levels. The official unemployment figures measure only registered unemploy-
ment and seemed to underestimate unemployment (i.e., the labor force as measured by the sum of employ-
ment and unemployment figures shrinking beyond immigration flows) during the downturn of the labor 
market, indicating fluctuations in unregistered unemployment. This problem was particularly clear and
significant in Jiu Valley in the late 1990s. We estimated unemployment rates by subtracting the official 
employment figure from our estimate of the  labor force. For the  Ostrava region we fixed the  size of 
the  labor force at the  average over the  period since there was little population growth or immigration
during the period. For the Jiu Valley region the labor force was held at the average until 1996, and after-
wards adjusted year-by-year by subtracting the significant net-immigration out of the region. Finally, note 
the implausibly low unemployment rate in Ostrava in 1996, which is due to an obvious error in the raw 
data for this year. Not knowing the magnitude of the error, we left it uncorrected. 
12 A 1996 European Union assessment of the labor market conditions of 21 European coal mining regions
ranked the Jiu Valley region as the fourth most ‘vulnerable’ to restructuring, and the Ostrava region as 
the third least vulnerable – see (European Union, 1996). 
13 The average wage was about 61 % of the mining wage in Hunedoara County from 1993 to 2000. 
The average wage in the Ostrava and Karvina districts was about 77 % of the mining wage, calculated as 
the gross wage divided by employment in OKD accounts, in the same period. (See Footnote 6 for admi-
nistrative divisions of the regions.) Further, Chiribuca, et al. (2000) estimate that the ex-miner’s wage was 
half of the  average wage in the  region. However, some of this differential is probably transitory and 
reflects the temporarily worse labor market conditions and the trial-and-error aspect of a job search. Ex-
-miners typically worked as laborers in construction, in public-works repair, and in the black market
(Larionescu, Rughinis, Radulescu, 1999). 
14 The hunger strike should be understood euphemistically: most participants left the protest site in the eve-
ning, presumably discontinuing hunger. Further, the participants considered the granting of governmental 
benefits to non-participants as encouraging ‘free riding’, which makes it clear that the participants per-
ceived the strike as a legitimate means of obtaining personal benefits.   278                                Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6 
ment and Implementation of Reconstruction Programs in Mining Regions (NAD). 
However, they seem to have been ineffective (Chiribuca, Comsa, Dincu, Rotariu, 
2000). In the Ostrava region, an ex-miner was compensated for the wage loss during 
the first year in a new job. An ex-miner also received some accident and sickness 
coverage and an extra annual pension of CZK 3,000 or about USD 100 after reti-
rement. We are not aware of any other social programs for ex-miners. The overall in-
centive for finding work may have been stronger in Ostrava than in Jiu Valley.  
3.  Evaluating the Restructuring Paths 
In this section, we quantitatively evaluate the efficiency of the restructuring 
paths in the two regions, taking into consideration the productivity inside the mines 
relative to outside, and the unemployment duration following layoffs. Our main ob-
jective is to assess whether the delay of restructuring in Jiu Valley was inefficient in 
the context of the overall restructuring path. At the outset, it is possible that the delay 
was relatively benign when compared to the massive layoff that followed, or even to 
the milder but significant layoffs in Ostrava early on.  
3.1  Measuring the Value of Labor inside Mines 
To measure the value of miners’ labor in coal production, we start with the fol-
lowing production function:  
tt t t YA K L
α γ =              (1) 
where  t Y  is the output,  t A  is the technology parameter,  t K  is all non-labor input, in-
cluding not only capital but also material input, and  t L  is labor input. To assess non- 
-labor input during restructuring, we consulted the accounts of the dominant mining 
companies, the OKD in Ostrava and the CNH in Jiu Valley, for the 1993–2000 pe-
riod.
15 The non-labor input cost as a share of revenue is on average 0.59 and 0.48, 
respectively, and there is no upward or downward trend in either company. Based on 
this, we assume that the observed shares are maintained throughout restructuring,
16 
so (1) becomes 
1
111
tt t t YA L
γ α
α αα µ − −− =           (2) 
where  µ  denotes the non-labor input share. 
The technology parameter  t A  reflects factors such as the upgrading of equip-
ment, the change in work practice, and the temporary impact of closing mines, which 
are important but not dominant aspects of restructuring in our case (see Footnote 9). 
15 The OKD produces about 80 % of Ostrava’s coal and, as mentioned, the CNH is the only mining com-
pany in Jiu Valley. The accounts for the earlier years were not publicly available.   
16 To elaborate on the rationale for constancy, it is plausible that the OKD could choose output and non-
-labor input (but not labor input) throughout the period. Then the marginal product of non-labor input 
would have been equal to the input price level, which implies that the non-labor input share was equal to α
in (1). The CNH, on the other hand, probably could not choose output (and labor input) freely due to its
more rigid output market, leaving no prediction on whether the non-labor input share should increase or 
decrease as we move from the  early to the  late 1990s: the  1997–1998 layoff would have increased 
the share of non-labor input as a substitute, but the accompanying reduction of output would have had the op-
posite effect. The CNH account suggests that the two effects roughly canceled each other out.  Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6                                        279 
Since our focus is on labor downsizing, we simply assume that these other aspects of 
restructuring keep pace with labor downsizing, i.e., At depends only on Lt. Further, 
we assume that the impact of At on the production function is to make it linear with re-
spect to Lt  during restructuring, so (2) becomes  
) ( t t t L L A Y Y − + =            (3) 
where Y  and  L  are the final levels of output and employment.
17 We fix these levels 
by the actual output and employment in 2001. The production function (3) is drawn 
as solid lines in Figures 1 and 2.
18 The function approximates the actual path of re-
structuring for the  Ostrava region, while there is little reason to consider a  more 
complex function for the Jiu Valley region. To emphasize, (3) is assumed to be valid 
during the 1990–2001 restructuring period and is not meant to be a long-run pro-
duction function.  
The value of  A , when production is measured at an annual rate, is 150 tons/ 
/worker for the Ostrava region and 52 tons/worker for the Jiu Valley region. The coal 
price, when measured in USD, was stable over the period except in the early 1990s in 
Ostrava and in the late 1990s in Jiu Valley, and there is no trend upward or down-
ward over the whole period in either region.
19 Avoiding the nominal noises of the un-
stable periods, we fix the price at the average, which was USD 35.4 and USD 22.5, 
respectively. The  upshot of all this is that the  value of output that accrued to 
the would-be-laid-off miners is  (1 )( ) t pY Y µ − −  in units of the current-period USD, 
where p denotes the coal price.  
3.2  Measuring the Value of Labor outside Mines  
To measure the value of ex-miners’ labor, we start with the following job-find-
ing function:  
tt M BU
ρ =              (4) 
where Mt is new employment, Ut is unemployment, B is a parameter that indicates 
the labor market condition aside from unemployment, and ρ is an elasticity para-
17 Note that the labor productivity Yt/Lt rises during restructuring in both regions. From (2) and (3), the total
factor productivity At rises during restructuring if  (1 ) / A α γ − < Y0/L0, which depends on α and γ. In the case 
of the Ostrava region, we could set α = 0.59 (see Footnote 16) so that the condition becomes γ > 0.13, 
which implies that the labor cost would be at least 13 % of revenue if the labor market were competitive. 
This is a highly plausible conjecture. Similarly, if we were to set α = 0.48 for Jiu Valley although we are 
less sure of its validity, the condition becomes γ > 0.18, which is again highly plausible. 
18 For the Ostrava region, the function is drawn through the 1991 point rather than the 1990 point. The large 
output drop from 1990 to 1991 largely represents the initial demand shock, as mentioned in Section 2,
rather than restructuring. 
19 The price was measured by dividing revenue by production volume and then converting this value to 
USD according to the current exchange rate. If we discount the price by the Consumer Price Index instead, 
we obtain the same periods of instability and a somewhat downward trend over the whole period, which is 
expected since the real value of USD depreciated over time. We assume that the price difference between 
the regions reflects the quality difference; price fluctuations reflect minor demand shocks, except when
the price increased from USD 22 in 1996 to USD 27 in 1997 in Jiu Valley, coming back down to USD 22 
by 2000. The  decline in production due to the  layoffs may have raised the  price and/or the  remaining 
mines and coal seams may have raised the quality of coal. 280                                Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6 
meter.
20 Let  t φ  denote the job finding rate:  / tt t M U φ ≡ . The reciprocal of this rate is 
the expected unemployment duration (i.e., the  duration that would be obtained if 
the  rate is maintained into the  future). We can estimate the  job-finding rate, or 
equivalently the  expected unemployment duration, from the  panel data of actual 
unemployment duration: in each period we follow the cohort of the newly unem-
ployed and see how many of them remain unemployed in the  following period. 
Estimated this way, in the Ostrava region the expected unemployment duration in-
creased from 7.8 months in the 1993–1995 period to 18.2 months in the 1999–2001 pe-
riod, an increase by a factor of 2.3.
21 Between the two periods, unemployment in-
creased by a factor of 3.0, which implies that ρ = 0.24 for the Ostrava region. In the Jiu 
Valley region, unemployment increased by a  factor of 4.0 from the  1993–1996 
period to the 1999–2000 period. We could estimate that the expected unemployment 
duration in the latter period was about three years.
22 For the former period, we can 
only guess that the expected unemployment duration may have been about one year, 
based on peripheral information.
23 Assuming the three-fold increase in the expected 
unemployment duration between the periods, we have ρ = 0.21 for the Jiu Valley re-
gion.
24 Given the values of ρ, we can calculate from (4) that when new employment 
is measured on a monthly basis, the parameter B is equal to 222 for the Ostrava re-
gion and 97 for the Jiu Valley region.  
Now we specify the unemployment inflow that feeds into the job-finding func-
tion (4). Let  t U
)
denote the  unemployment of ex-miners, and  t U
(
 that of the others: 
ttt UUU =+
) (
. The  unemployment inflow of miners is given by the  layoff path: 
0 0 U =
)
 and 
     11 (1 ) tt t t t UU L L φ + − =− +−
) )
           (5) 
20 The job-finding function can be considered as a version of the matching function 
tt t
mb u v
θ ϑ =  with
the free entry condition  / f tt t m c ν ⋅ = , where vt is the number of vacancies, c is the vacancy cost, and ft is 
the value of a filled job. Setting the matching to be decreasing returns to scale (i.e.,  1 θϑ + < ) and fixing 
the  value of a  filled job ft, we obtain (4) by substitution and with the  appropriate changes of variables. 
The same result follows from setting the value of a filled job to be log-linear in the number of matches 
(i.e.,  tt f zm
ν =  where z is a constant and  (1 (1 ) (1 )) /( (1 ))) ν θϑ θ θ θ ϑ ϑ < −− − − − − ). 
21 We could only obtain the annual data of unemployment duration for the greater Ostrava region, which is 
composed of five districts including the two districts of our interest, Ostrava and Karvina, from the Czech 
Statistical Office. Since the drop in the job-finding rate may have been more severe in the two-district 
region, the following estimate of ρ may be an overestimate. 
22 This is based on Chiribuca, et al. (2000) and the annual data of unemployment duration for Hunedoara
County that includes Jiu Valley. Chiribuca, et al. (2000) estimate that 27 % of all miners laid off from 
1997 to 1999, nearly all of whom were laid-off in 1997, were working in 1999. For Hunedoara County, we
estimated the expected unemployment duration to be about 29 months in the 1999–2000 period.   
23 Using the annual data of unemployment duration at the national level from the Romanian Statistical 
Office, we estimated the expected unemployment duration to be about 12 months in the 1996–1997 period. 
The unemployment rate of Jiu Valley was comparable to the national average prior to 1997. Our guess 
would be valid if the labor market conditions aside from the unemployment rate (i.e., scale-adjusted B in 
Equations 4 and 5) were comparable, too.   
24 The lack of precision for ρ is not crucial for the main result, as the sensitivity analysis in Section 3.3 
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Similary, we have 
     11 (1 ) tt t t UU Z φ + + =− +
( (
            (6) 
where  t Z  is the inflow of non-ex-miners. We set  0 U
(
 and  t Z  so that the sequence of 
total unemployment corresponds to the data under the actual layoff path. Recall that 
in both regions unemployment was steady until 1997, after which it became signi-
ficantly worse. In Ostrava the worsened situation was largely due to the layoffs in 
the metallurgical industry, unrelated to mining restructuring. Accordingly, we set  
10 tt Z U φ + =
(
            (7) 
for all periods except for the 1997–2000 period, and  
10 tt Z UZ φ + = +
(
            (8) 
for the 1997–2000 period, where  Z  is a fixed additional layoff. In Jiu Valley the wor-
sened situation was virtually entirely due to the layoffs in mining and those linked to 
mining. To preserve this linkage under various layoff paths, we set  
       10 1 () tt t t ZU L L φη ++ =+−
(
           (9) 
for all periods, where η  is the additional layoff as a fixed fraction of the mining lay-
off.
25 The values of  0 U
(
 and Z  that best simulate the monthly unemployment path for 
Ostrava were 14,900 and 2,500; the values of  0 U
(
 and η  that do the same for Jiu Val-
ley were 8,000 and 0.78.
26   
Now we can calculate the sequence of ex-miners’ employment using (4) to (9): 
           1 ˆ
tt t t NN U φ + =+            ( 1 0 )  
where  t N  denotes the ex-miners’ employment.
27 We estimate the value of newly em-
ployed ex-miners’ labor using the actual wages in the regions. In the Ostrava region, 
the gross annual average wage 
28 when measured in units of coal and then converted 
to USD 
29 was USD 3,507 in 1990 and grew at an annual rate of 4.5 % on average 
over the years, reaching USD 5,709 in 2001. In the Jiu Valley region, for the 1993–2000 
25 There would have been extra unemployment linked to mining in Ostrava as well, although we don’t
know its extent. Since the extra unemployment linked to mining would lead to a slower pace of optimal 
restructuring, the bias resulting from the modeled asymmetry between the regions is a safe one: it rein-
forces the result that the actual restructuring path in Ostrava, although slower than the optimal one, was 
closer to optimal than in Jiu Valley.  
26 Recall that there was significant emigration out of Jiu Valley in the late 1990s, no doubt as a con-
sequence of the massive layoffs (Footnote 11). Since η is calibrated to the unemployment path in Jiu Val-
ley, its value is net of the emigration of those laid-off, including ex-miners.   
27 Here we have assumed that the job-finding rate of the emigrant ex-miners is the same as that of the mi-
ners who stayed (see the previous footnote). We are not sure about the employment prospects of the emi-
grant ex-miners, but they were probably not very different from those of the ex-miners who stayed. Many 
of the emigrants returned after a while, unable to find work elsewhere. 
28 That is, before any taxes including the social security tax paid by the employer. The gross wage is
the proper measure of the market value of labor.   282                                Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6 
period the same method yields an average wage of USD 2,530 and a virtually zero 
growth rate. Let wt denote the growth path of the gross average wage as described 
here. For the years beyond 2001, we assume that in both regions the annual growth 
rate of wt adjusts gradually to a more typical rate of 2.0 % during the 2001–2005 pe-
riod and thereafter stays at this rate.
30 As discussed in Section 2, in Ostrava the ex- 
-miner’s wage was probably not far from the average wage since ex-miners seem to 
have had little difficulty in adjusting to new occupations, whereas in Jiu Valley ex- 
-miners had great difficulty in adjusting to new occupations with their wage as low as 
half of the average wage in the region (see Footnote 13). Let λ denote the ex-miner’s 
wage as a share of the gross average wage. As a benchmark, we assume that λ is 
equal to 1.00 in Ostrava, and to 0.75 in Jiu Valley. Putting all this together, the value 
of the ex-miners’ labor is  tt wN λ  in each period. 
3.3  Measuring the Efficiency of Restructuring Paths 
Now we are ready to evaluate the paths of restructuring, using the above cali-
brated model. Let  t W  denote momentary welfare, i.e. the value of (laid-off) miners’ 
labor both inside and outside the mines:  (1 )( ) tt t t Wp Y Y w N µλ =− − + . Let {}
a
t L  de-
note the actual layoff path and { }
a
t W  the actual welfare path associated with {}
a
t L . 
This welfare path, as an annual rate, is depicted by the solid lines in Figures 3 and 4, 
with the 1990 level normalized as zero. In the Ostrava region, 
a
t W  increases gradu-
ally in accordance with the gradual restructuring, except for a mild dip in the late 1990s 
due to the worsened unemployment situation. In the Jiu Valley region, 
a
t W  changed 
little until 1997, after which a large downward and then upward swing followed due 
to the massive layoff. 
The welfare proper is the discounted sum of momentary welfare, and the opti-
mal layoff path, denoted by { }
o
t L , is the one that maximizes welfare:  
{}
1




LW L L β
∞
=
⎧ ⎫ ⎪ ⎪ =≥ ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎩⎭
∑        (11) 
where β is the discount rate.
31 Since the labor market flows are on a monthly basis, 
we set the period to be month-long and adjust output and wage accordingly. We 
assume that β = 0.995, which is equivalent to an annual discount rate of about 6 %.
32 
29 Thus we are measuring the value of labor both inside and outside mines in units of coal, and then
multiplying it by the price of coal, which is assumed to be fixed in USD (see Section 3.1). Again, 
the fixed-price assumption avoids the nominal noises of periods when prices were unstable.   
30 Recall that the number of remaining miners is fixed from 2001, so an alternative series of growth rates 
from then on will have only a marginal impact on the evaluation of restructuring paths.  
31 Note that the sum is over the infinite horizon. This is conceptually proper if we view restructuring as
a reallocation of labor that by default will be maintained indefinitely. 
32 Since the price and the wage are in units of current USD, the discount rate is a combination of the depre-
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We solved this maximization problem numerically. Given a sequence of Lt, we can cal-
culate the expected discounted sum of the value of a miner’s labor, which only depends 
on the timing of his layoff. Further, we can calculate the externality that a miner impo-
ses on the other miners by congesting the labor market,
33 which again only depends on 
the timing of his layoff. The timing of layoffs can then be ordered by the expected dis-
counted sum of the value of a miner’s labor net of his externality. By construction, 
we can increase welfare by moving the timing of layoffs from a low-value period to 
a high-value period. Starting with an arbitrarily chosen sequence of Lt, we updated it 
repeatedly by moving the timing of a single miner’s layoff from the lowest-value pe-
riod to the highest-value period until all layoff periods had the highest value.  
Let {}
o
t W  denote the optimal welfare path associated with the optimal layoff 
path {}
o
t L . This welfare path is depicted by the dashed lines in Figures 3 and 4. For 
both regions, there is a sharp initial decline which indicates a massive layoff. In Ostra-
FIGURE 3  Welfare Path in Ostrava 
 
FIGURE 4  Welfare Path in Jiu Valley 
33 See Equation 4. Note that we are abstracting from the externality that miners impose on non-miners or 
vacant firms in the labor market. Whether this externality is overall positive or negative would depend on 
the labor market properties, in addition to those that we have assumed. 284                                Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6 
va, 63 % of all layoffs take place in the first month, and the entire period of layoffs 
lasts 16 months. Even more dramatic, in Jiu Valley the period of layoffs lasts only 
four months, with 97 % of all layoffs occurring in the first month alone. At the be-
ginning of the 1990s, under the benchmark parameter values, the value of a miner’s 
labor in mining as a share of that in alternative employment is 62 % in Ostrava and 
32 % in Jiu Valley. These value differentials largely outweigh the congestion effect of 
a massive layoff on the labor markets, which were initially in fair condition. Subse-
quent to the  massive layoffs, 
o
t W  rises as ex-miners find jobs. The  unemployment 
duration, on average across ex-miners, is 12 months in Ostrava and 30 months in Jiu 
Valley. The  shorter duration for Ostrava is because of a  larger local labor market: 
the unemployment rate is maintained below 15 % throughout, while in Jiu Valley it 
reaches over 50 % in the first few months.
34 The transitional impact of restructuring is 
over within the first two or three years in Ostrava and by the middle of the 1990s in Jiu 
Valley, after which 
o
t W  follows the respective wage growth in the regions. The overall 
inefficiency of actual restructuring can be measured as the difference in welfare (i.e., 
the sum in (11)) between the optimal and the actual paths as a share of welfare under 
the optimal path, i.e.,  11 . () /
to a t o
tt t tt WW W ββ
∞∞
== − ∑∑  This measure of inefficiency is 
8.8  % for the  Ostrava region and 26.7  % for the  Jiu Valley region. Thus the  actual 
restructuring path was three times more inefficient in Jiu Valley than in Ostrava.  
The main result of the exercise is that the delay of restructuring in Jiu Valley was 
indeed inefficient. The layoff of 1997, on the other hand, is justifiable: given that there 
was no restructuring until then, the optimal path would be a massive layoff as occurred. 
In Ostrava the pace of restructuring should have been faster too, but the welfare loss is 
much smaller than in Jiu Valley since there was a substantial layoff from early on while 
the case for a massive layoff is weaker than in Jiu Valley. A natural question is how 
sensitive the results are to the assumed parameter values. In this regard there are three 
key parameters: the productivity parameter  A , the ex-miner’s wage factor λ, and the job- 
-finding elasticity ρ. The first two parameters matter only as a ratio, i.e., holding  λ / A  
constant, any change leads to only a re-scaling of welfare (see (11)). To see the extent to 
which the pace of optimal restructuring can be slowed down, we increase this ratio by 
50 %, which is probably the reasonable upper bound. We also set ρ = 0, which implies 
that job creation is completely irresponsive to an  increase in unemployment. Under 
these sets of values, the initial layoff as a percentage of the entire layoff decreases to 
21 % in Ostrava and to 44 % in Jiu Valley, and the layoff duration increases to 50 
and 68 months, respectively. Therefore, the optimal restructuring path is moderate rela-
tive to the benchmark, but still exhibits quicker layoffs than the actual path.
35   
34 The relatively favorable labor market outcome in Ostrava may be an exaggeration since we have as-
sumed extra unemployment linked to, and in proportion to, mining unemployment in all periods in Jiu 
Valley, but not in Ostrava (see Section 3.2). If we assume extra unemployment linked to mining in Ostrava
as well, the resulting unemployment rate would be higher even though this effect would be mitigated by
the slower restructuring pace (see Footnote 25). Regardless of this, under any reasonable extent of extra
unemployment, a large difference in the labor market outcome between the regions would remain.  
35 The inefficiency measure for the actual path, under these alternative parameter values, is 5.6 % in Ostra-
va and 26.5 % in Jiu Valley. The small change in inefficiency from the benchmark in Jiu Valley is the re-
sult of two off-setting effects: the inefficiency of inaction in the early 1990’s is reduced but the speed of 
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4.  Explaining the Restructuring Paths 
In this section, we address the central question that emerges from the quan-
titative exercise: why was restructuring delayed in Jiu Valley? At the center of our 
explanation is the miners’ action against restructuring. The miners were a force to be 
reckoned with not only in mining restructuring but also in national politics. The mine-
riadas, the miners’ marches, in the early 1990s were effective in suppressing pro-
gressive voices such as intellectuals and students as well as right-wing politicians. 
Without the miners’ action, the structural reform of the economy would have pro-
ceeded faster and, in particular, some kind of mining restructuring would probably 
have occurred in the early 1990s.  
4.1 Gradual Restructuring with Transfer Payments 
We first examine whether the difficulty of extracting the benefits from early 
restructuring led the miners to pursue a delay in restructuring. Our strategy is to see 
whether we could design a plausible transfer scheme that would have benefited both 
the miners and the government. An implicit assumption is that the welfare effects of 
actual restructuring on the miners and the government represent what both parties 
could expect at the beginning of the 1990s. We will discuss the consequences of re-
laxing this assumption in Section 4.2. We focus on a lump-sum severance payment, 
which was the means of compensation in actual restructuring. We doubt that a more 
sophisticated transfer scheme could have worked. For example, severance payment 
in installments would have allowed greater flexibility in restructuring paths but it 
would not have appeared credible: there was a general lack of trust in the government 
and, once laid off, the miners might not have been able to make the government stick 
to its side of the bargain.
36 Given that optimal restructuring requires a massive layoff 
at the beginning of 1990s, the main difficulty of the scheme is its financing: the go-
vernment was not running budget deficits but its ability to borrow was limited, which 
reflects its lack of credibility among creditors.
37 This limits the pace of restructuring 
to a gradual rate.  
Let Gt denote the net government spending on miners in period t given layoff 
path {} t L  and severance payments { } t s : 
         1 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) tt t t t t t Gw L p Y s LL ζ τµ − = −⋅− −⋅+ − tt wN λτ −  
where  ζ  denotes the miner’s wage premium and τ the tax on wages. The first two 
terms are the  net spending on current miners, the  second term the severance pay-
ments, and the third term the tax revenue from ex-miners. The miner’s wage was about 
63 % above the average wage in Jiu Valley in the 1990s, so we set λ %  = 1.63 (see 
Footnote 13). We set τ = .46, which includes the social security and income taxes.
38 
36 More generally, there is an argument that the workers’ unions fight over the size of membership as 
a means of ensuring future rents. See (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2001) for a formal treatment of this.  
37 The government was widely perceived as unreformed ex-communists. The miners’ action itself signi-
ficantly contributed to this perception (see Section 4.3). Had the miners and the government pursued early 
restructuring as envisioned here, the creditors may have been more receptive. 
38 See Footnote 11 for the sources of the labor market data used here. The employer paid about 38 % of 
wages as social security tax. The employee paid about 25 % of wages as income tax. So, the total tax rate 
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The    actual severance payments ranged from 12 to 20 months of a  miner’s wage 
during the  large layoff starting in 1997. For the  actual restructuring path, we ap-
proximate the severance payments by setting st to be 16 months of a miner’s net 
wage from 1997 to 1999, and to be zero otherwise. For the gradual restructuring path, 
we fix st at a level denoted by  s . We assume that the budget constraint allows 
a fixed per-period expense D in addition to the actual expenditures on miners: for all 
1 T ≥ ,  









− −≤ ∑          ( 1 2 )  
where 
a
t G  denotes the spending under actual restructuring and 
g
t G  that under gra-
dual restructuring.  
Given D and s , the gradual layoff path is given by the right-hand side of (11) 
with (12) as an additional constraint. A higher value of D allows for faster restruc-
turing. We base its value on the actual government spending on the mines at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. The total wage bill (i.e.,  00 wL ζ ) was USD 138 million at the an-
nual rate. It becomes USD 79.9 million after subtracting the sales revenue (i.e., 
0 (1 ) pY µ −⋅ ), and USD 16.7 million after further subtracting the tax revenue (i.e., 
00 wL τζ ). We consider 50 % of the final figure within the reasonable range of ad-
ditional spending, and set D equal to USD 8.4 million annually. This is modest in 
comparison to about USD 49 million that the government spent on severance pay-
ments in 1997 when it initiated the  layoff.
39  The values  of  s  are limited by 
the condition that the scheme should benefit both the miners and the government. Let 
σ denote the government share of the welfare gain:  
       
11
()( ) 0






− =− = ∑∑        (13) 
where 
g
t W  denotes the momentary welfare under gradual restructuring. A higher value 
of  s  implies a lower value of σ, and vice-versa. Thus the gradual restructuring paths 
are parameterized by σ in between 0 and 1.  
Depending on σ, the values of s  range from USD 7,000 to 10,100, or 37.5 to 
54 months of a miner’s net wage. The welfare gain (i.e., the right-hand side of (13) 
without σ) ranges from USD 61.4 to 76.6 million, a higher value of σ corresponding 
to a  greater welfare gain due to a  faster and therefore more efficient pace of re-
structuring. As a  corollary, the  first figure in the  range is the  upper bound in 
the miners’ welfare gain, which translates to USD 3,300, or 17.5 months of a miner’s 
net wage, per laid-off miner. The  layoff starts with 70 to 100 miners in the  first 
month and gradually accelerates, reaching 350 to 600 miners in the final months.
40 
39 The severance payment was in the range of 12 to 20 months of a miner’s wage. We estimated the go-
vernment spending on severance payments in 1997 by the fall in the number of miners from the previous 
year multiplied by 16 months of a miner’s wage net of tax. 
40 The 350 figure is after excluding the last seven months of the layoff, when the layoff pace jumps above 
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The  gradual acceleration is because the  savings in the  mines and the  tax revenue 
from ex-miners accumulate allowing the government increasing expenditure on se-
verance payments. The entire duration of the layoff is 61 to 79 months, which im-
plies that gradual restructuring would have been (nearly) over by the  time actual 
restructuring began. The dotted line in Figure 2 draws the welfare path under gradual 
restructuring when σ = 0.5, in which case the miners and the government would have 
divided the welfare gain equally and we obtain approximately the mid-point in all 
the above ranges. In summary, gradual restructuring with a lump-sum severance pay-
ment scheme, under a reasonable government budget constraint, would have bene-
fited both the miners and the government.
41  
4.2  The Nature of the Miners’ Action 
We now examine what motivated the  miners’ action against restructuring, 
aside from the difficulty of extracting the benefits from early restructuring and in 
the order of ease with which they can be reconciled with our quantitative exercise. 
One possibility is that the miners expected that restructuring could be delayed longer 
than it actually was, which would have increased their payoff from the delay.
42 
The issue is whether such an expectation was reasonable and whether it lowers the pay-
off from early restructuring relative to that from the delay in restructuring. Perhaps 
the miners expected that the demand for coal could recover after its initial collapse, 
which would have reduced the necessity of restructuring. There was no specific rea-
son for such an expectation but there was a good deal of uncertainty about economic 
prospects in general. If we incorporate the possibility of recovery of demand into our 
exercise, it would slow down the optimal pace of restructuring but not to a halt, much 
like the transfer constraints do.
43 In other words, uncertain demand makes a case for 
gradual restructuring rather than against it. Perhaps the miners expected that the go-
vernment would continue to pay for the loss in the mines instead of opting for 
the layoff in 1997. The 1997 layoff was indeed a consequence of the electoral suc-
cess of reformist parties, which could not have been foreseen. If we incorporate into 
our exercise the possibility of a further delay in restructuring due to electoral uncer-
tainty, however, the welfare gain from early restructuring becomes only larger and 
gradual restructuring with a greater level of transfer would benefit both the miners 
and the government in comparison to their expected payoffs from the delay.  
Another possible motivation for the miners’ action is that they were concerned 
about the unfair burden of restructuring on the laid-off miners. In our exercise, the wel-
fare of a laid-off miner falls below that of a retained miner even under gradual restruc-
turing with severance payment. For a miner who was 35 years old and had 20 years of 
remaining work life in 1990, his welfare loss would have been USD 3,200 to 6,400, 
or 17 to 34.5 months of the miner’s net wage.
44 This could be an underestimate since 
41 We conducted a sensitivity analysis on  A % , λ, and ρ, as in Section 3. The gradual restructuring path 
varies little across different values. This is because the budget constraint (12) is the binding constraint, 
little affected by these parameters. 
42  A 1993–1994 survey conducted by the  mining company CNH shows that a  majority of employees 
believed that downsizing would occur, but they were much less concerned about its danger than that of
inflation (see (Krausz, 1999)). 
43 For a general argument for gradual reform under uncertainty, see (Dewatripont, Roland. 1995), among 
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our exercise ignored the social costs of large unemployment such as the spread of al-
coholism and higher crime and divorce rates, as observed in the aftermath of the 1997 
layoff (see (Larionescu, et al., 1999), (Kideckel, 2000)). Many of these costs would 
be borne by the laid-off miners themselves. Nonetheless, the advantage of early re-
structuring over delayed restructuring remains. A built-in feature of severance pay-
ment as a transfer method is to compensate precisely those who would suffer from 
layoffs, so the miners’ welfare gain from early restructuring would go entirely to 
the laid-off miners. As mentioned, in our exercise the expected gain for a laid-off 
miner is up to USD 3,300, or 17.5 months of the miner’s net wage, equivalent to elimi-
nating half of the above-profiled miner’s welfare loss. Consideration for social costs 
only strengthens the case for a gradual layoff since they are presumably the most acute 
when unemployment is concentrated in a short period.  
Based on our exercise and possible extensions, we find it difficult to make 
the  case that the  miners acted on their best guess of the  situation. In particular, 
the rationale for the last mineriada of 1999 is hard to imagine: it took place facing 
the  united progressive government after the  massive layoff was nearly finished. 
The difficulty is compounded by individual miners’ reactions to the restructuring ini-
tiative by the new government in 1997. The large number of miners who opted for 
the layoff was beyond expectation and the government had to take some measures to 
curb the layoff after the initial round. This is hard to reconcile with their collective 
behavior. In our exercise, the miners as a whole were excessively resistant to restruc-
turing while they were individually excessively conducive to it. Exploring explana-
tory factors outside our exercise, we could speculate on inefficiencies resulting from 
some sort of game between the miners and the government, or between the union 
leadership and the members.
45 However, we do not have enough information to pro-
ceed with confidence and rigor. 
In the exploratory note, we mention a clue that was effectively thrust upon us 
from our readings and interviews, namely the militant history of Jiu Valley miners. 
During the communist era, the miners acquired the reputation for militancy and con-
sidered themselves the backbone of labor. For example, the 1977 revolt, the last be-
fore the 1990s, was a reaction to the belt-tightening policy of industrialization under 
Ceausescu’s regime and achieved various improvements in miners’ livelihoods and 
heralded a series of similar actions in the other regions. Therefore, group militancy 
may be a behavioral pattern of Jiu Valley miners under perceived threats to the sta-
tus-quo. At the same time, individual myopia may be another behavioral pattern of 
Jiu Valley miners. Chiribuca et al. (2000) argue that it was irrational short-sighted 
behavior for the miners to accept the compensation package and become unemployed 
in 1997 and 1998 when they had little prospect of finding alternative employment.
46 
44 To be precise, given a gradual restructuring path, calculate the expected discounted sum of wages and 
the severance payment during the remainder of his work life conditional on being laid off with the timing 
of the  layoff randomly distributed according to the  layoff schedule. This sum is smaller than the  dis-
counted sum of wages conditional on not being laid off by the stated range of amounts. 
45 There may have been hidden deals between the miners and the government (see Section 4.3 for some clues). 
The union leadership may have had a private agenda: Cozma apparently became wealthy as well as politically
influential while the miners’ action was successful. The confrontations between the miners and the govern-
ment in the  past may have affected the  expectation for the  events in the  1990s (more on this below). 
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The authors point out that the less educated and thus lower-prospect miners were 
more likely to accept the compensation package. Most miners consumed away the com-
pensation payment rather than use it to prepare themselves for new work (e.g., 
training, relocation). Having exhausted the payment, some miners resorted to ways of 
obtaining short-term benefits from the government rather than actively searching for 
new work, as highlighted by the hunger-strikes.
47   
The behavioral pattern of Jiu Valley miners sharply contrasts with that of 
Ostrava miners. The latter did not have a history of revolt and confrontation, and in 
the 1990s cooperated with the government and carried out gradual restructuring from 
early on. Furthermore, individual miners were proactive in looking for and adjusting 
to new work. Militancy as a behavioral pattern helps explain the events in the 1990s 
to the extent that they were predictable based on the (absence of) previous actions.
48 
We emphasize the explanatory nature of this explanation since we have assumed 
rather than explained the persistence of militancy. Furthermore, persistent militancy 
does not preclude rational interpretations: it can possibly be an equilibrium of the dy-
namic game alluded to above.  
4.3  The Corroborating Factors for the Miners’ Action 
We now examine why the miners’ action was effective in delaying restruc-
turing. The miners received at least tacit support from the conservative faction within 
the government. Without it, their action could easily have failed as the later events 
under the successor government demonstrate. It is debatable how much of the sup-
port reflected the conservatives’ stance on reform policy. Some, notably President 
Iliescu, may have genuinely believed that the reform could and should have been 
carried out without large-scale enterprise restructuring. They may have been hopeful 
of an economic turnaround without restructuring, being concerned about its social 
and distributive consequences. We examined these concerns as they pertain to the Jiu 
Valley restructuring in Section 4.2. As mentioned, our view is that justifiable caution 
does not explain the absence of initiatives for Jiu Valley restructuring in the early 
1990s. The Ostrava region did carry out substantial restructuring early on, even tough 
the initial demand shock and the necessity of restructuring were similar to, – in fact, 
within our exercise, weaker than – those in Jiu Valley.  
46 The government may have chosen the compensation package rather than a more comprehensive labor 
conversion program because the compensation package minimized the resistance from the myopic miners. 
This is in line with the political aspect of restructuring discussed in Section 4.3. 
47 The above discussion can be placed in the context of the ‘socialist patrimonialism’ in Romanian society 
during the communist era – see (Linden, 1986). 
48 Looking beyond the two regions of our inquiry, it is not new that a labor union may fight a losing battle 
to the end. A good example is the 1984 British coal miners’ strike. The British miners went on a year-long 
strike against restructuring despite an offer of a generous severance payment. In the end, the strike achiev-
ed nothing but lost pay and a ruined reputation for the miners. The miners, at least the union leadership, 
seem to have been driven by more than the narrow economic interests of the miners; perhaps they were 
driven by the ideology of socialist order or, more specifically, the involvement of the union in manage-
ment decision-making. The tripartite agreement, achieved ten years earlier through a series of strikes, in-
deed guaranteed something of this nature. The turning point was the attempt by the Thatcher government 
to nullify this arrangement. Under a threat to the status quo and under the memory of previous successful 
strikes, the  miners may have been overly prepared for action, not unlike the  Jiu Valley miners. See 
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A more sinister reason for the conservatives’ allying with the miners can be 
ascertained from the aforementioned miners’ role in national politics. Notably, a 1991 
mineriada forced the resignation of reform-minded Prime Minister Roman, the arch- 
-rival of President Iliescu. It was widely believed that the conservative faction of 
the government called for the miners’ action. Thus the conservative faction may have 
wanted to keep miners as a useful political force. Conversely, the massive layoff of 
1997 under the progressive government may have been in part motivated by its desire 
to eliminate an opposition force while it was possible to do so.
49 This is a rationa-
lization of the view, expressed by many in our interviews, that the new government 
took ‘revenge’ on miners for the earlier mineriadas. This aspect of the layoff corro-
borates with the fact that the final mineriada of 1999 seems to have taken place in 
alliance with the new nationalist party that tried to overthrow the government.  
The miners’ action was ultimately arbitrated by the Romanian population. Al-
though the mineriadas were an extra-legal method of influencing policy, they were 
sympathetically received by a large segment of Romanian society. The electoral suc-
cess of 1990 and 1992 gave basic strength to the  conservative faction of the  go-
vernment, which was supplemented by the miners’ action. Conversely, the election 
of 1996 drove out the  conservative faction and installed the  new progressive go-
vernment, which was willing to confront the miners. When the alliance with the con-
servatives crumbled, the miners were outmaneuvered in the mineriada of 1999 and 
finally defeated as a political force.
50 Therefore, the success of the miners’ action was 
bound by its appeal to sections of the government and, by extension, to the popu-
lation at large. 
5.  Conclusion 
Our exercise shows that the delay in restructuring the Jiu Valley mines was 
indeed inefficient: it stands out as the main source of inefficiency in the overall re-
structuring path, all the  more so when compared to Ostrava’s restructuring path. 
Gradual restructuring with severance payment would have benefited both the miners 
and the government. Thus our exercise leaves an incomplete explanation of the Jiu 
Valley miners’ action against restructuring. Among the possible explanatory factors 
outside our exercise, we note the militant history of Jiu Valley miners in contrast to 
Ostrava miners. We also note that their success depended on an alliance with the con-
servative faction of the government and, by extension, on the Romanian electorate. 
We are admittedly vague about the development and persistence of militancy in Jiu 
Valley and about the changes in the societal support for the miners’ action. We can 
only muse that the Jiu Valley restructuring may represent a sort of adaptive learning 
experience for Romanian society, whereby economic conflicts are increasingly re-
solved in the market rather than in the political arena.  
49 This interpretation can be couched in an extension of the argument in Footnote 36: a government tries to 
affect the size of a union as a means of ensuring the benefit, or eliminating the harm, from the union. 
50 The epilogue of this sequence of events is the reemergence of the conservative faction in the 2000 elec-
tion. By then the main phase of mining restructuring was finished. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6                                        291 
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